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A PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT REMEDY FOR 
INFORMATION MISUSE 
PETER C. ORMEROD* 
Abstract: Misuse of users’ personally identifiable information is persistent and 
pervasive. This Article addresses two questions: why is information misuse so 
common and so severe and how could domestic law change to make it less so? 
I use a simple model to illustrate that companies externalize information misuse 
costs onto users, which has two related but distinct effects: chronic underinvest-
ment in information security and excessive retention of user data. I then seize 
on this observation to propose a specific legal vehicle at the heart of this Arti-
cle—a private enforcement remedy. This private enforcement remedy has four 
essential features. First, the remedy must be created under state law. State law 
provides a viable alternative when federal courts have used the constitutional 
standing doctrine to express overt hostility to privacy harms. Second, the law 
should impose a fiduciary duty on entities that collect or retain users’ infor-
mation. Structuring the remedy this way insulates it from attack by a weapon-
ized First Amendment. Third, breach of an information fiduciary’s duty should 
be a strict liability tort. The arguments for strict liability in products liability 
cases apply with even greater force to informational harms. Fourth, the statute 
that creates this private enforcement remedy should prescribe a schedule that 
begins with nominal damages and attorney’s fees for strict liability, and it 
should increase monetary penalties with a defendant’s culpability. The rem-
edy’s central purpose is to reshape incentives, so the damages schedule should 
not be unduly punitive or effect a windfall for plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
INTRODUCTION 
If you are an American with a credit card, your identity was almost cer-
tainly stolen in 2017.1 If you ever had a Yahoo account, at least one hacker 
group—and perhaps more—walked off with the keys to your account a few 
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 1 See Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 8, 2017), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do [https://perma.cc/JN6Z-
XCZA] (“If you have a credit report, there’s a good chance that you’re one of the 143 million American 
consumers whose sensitive personal information was exposed in a data breach at Equifax . . . .”). 
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years earlier.2 Even if you never had an account with Facebook or Instagram, 
Facebook knows who you are, maintains a secret dossier about you, and pro-
vides that dossier to advertisers—but you can neither access nor delete that 
information.3 
The devices in your home are listening to you and sometimes send re-
cordings of your conversations to your acquaintances.4 Your wireless service 
provider knows every single place you go and—until recently—gave that in-
formation to law enforcement when it asked.5 Ninety-two percent of the web-
sites you visit have embedded Google trackers, so Google knows just about 
every place you visit on the Internet—whether or not you have a Google ac-
count or use any Google services.6 There were over three billion unique and 
real identities exposed online in 2017, which represents a sixty-four percent 
increase over 2016.7 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 Attack, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-3-billion-users.html 
[https://perma.cc/3FLB-WFLK] (“Digital thieves made off with names, birth dates, phone numbers 
and passwords of users that were encrypted with security that was easy to crack. The intruders also 
obtained the security questions and backup email addresses used to reset lost passwords . . . .”). 
 3 See Kashmir Hill, Facebook Is Giving Advertisers Access to Your Shadow Contact Infor-
mation, GIZMODO (Sept. 26, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-is-giving-advertisers-access-to-
your-shadow-co-1828476051 [https://perma.cc/W7TM-4X9D]; Kashmir Hill, How Facebook Fig-
ures Out Everyone You’ve Ever Met, GIZMODO (Nov. 7, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/how-face-
book-figures-out-everyone-youve-ever-met-1819822691 [https://perma.cc/VNT3-VJN6]. 
 4 See Heather Kelly, How an Alexa Speaker Recorded and Shared a Private Conversation, 
CNN (May 24, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/05/24/technology/alexa-secret-recording/index.
html [https://perma.cc/2L2Q-W3G4]; see also Matt Day, Giles Turner & Natalia Drozdiak, Amazon 
Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2019-04-10/is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio 
[https://perma.cc/B84A-89JV]; Alex Hern, Apple Contractors ‘Regularly Hear Confidential De-
tails’ on Siri Recordings, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings [https://perma.
cc/D64S-GMN8]; James Vlahos, Smart Talking: Are Our Devices Threatening Our Privacy?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/26/smart-talking-
are-our-devices-threatening-our-privacy [https://perma.cc/W89J-R9BD]. 
 5 See, e.g., AT&T February 2017 Transparency Report 4 (Feb. 10, 2017), http://about.att.com/
content/dam/csr/Transparency%20Reports/Feb-2017-Transparency-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4YYX-LL24] (reporting that the company received 50,000 requests for customers’ location history 
from law enforcement in 2016). But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) 
(holding that the warrantless acquisition of cell-site location information violated the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 6 Ibrahim Altaweel et al., Web Privacy Census, TECH. SCI. (Dec. 15, 2015), https://techscience.
org/a/2015121502/ [https://perma.cc/2PKG-6XAF] (“We found that Google tracking infrastructure 
is on 92 of the top 100 most popular websites and on 923 of the top 1,000 websites, providing 
Google with a significant surveillance infrastructure online.”). 
 7 See 2018 4iQ Identity Breach Report 5 (May 2018), https://webcdn.4iq.com/2019/05/1019
1838/2018_IdentityBreachReport_4iQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ9H-2URT]. 
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These examples and more demonstrate that the excessive collection, re-
tention, and misuse of users’ personally identifiable information is both per-
sistent and pervasive. This Article addresses two questions: why does infor-
mation misuse keep happening and what, if anything, can we do to make in-
formation misuse less frequent and less severe? 
Many people would probably feel uncomfortable entrusting their phys-
ical belongings to a company that cannot be held liable for misusing those 
things. Yet this basically describes the current information security regulatory 
environment. A brief review of authorities reveals that there is no meaningful 
legal deterrent for information misuse. By and large, the authorities that do 
exist are grossly inadequate and that is only starting to change at the margins. 
I explain that there is no legal mechanism for punishing or deterring infor-
mation misuse and illustrate that preventing information misuse is often an 
irrational decision. 
If we agree that providing users with a new remedy would help reshape 
incentives, what would that remedy need to look like? The heart of this Arti-
cle is a specific policy proposal, which I refer to as a private enforcement 
remedy. To be effective, this remedy must have four features. 
First, the remedy must be created under state law. In recent years, the 
federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, have made it increasingly difficult 
to vindicate information security rights and harms under the doctrine of con-
stitutional standing. At the Supreme Court, this trend most recently culmi-
nated in the 2016 decision Spokeo v. Robins, which held that a statutorily 
recognized right was not sufficiently “concrete” under Article III to constitute 
a “case or controversy” that could be adjudicated by federal courts.8 Spokeo 
and its progeny in the lower courts are an enormous problem for information 
security regulatory reform because users whose information has been com-
promised are generally foreclosed from suing in federal court. Thankfully, 
Article III’s demanding injury-in-fact requirement applies only in federal 
court. The states are free—indeed, I argue, designed and assumed—to pro-
vide a forum for wide-ranging relief from harms that are (arguably) insuffi-
ciently concrete in federal court. Below, I trace the origins of constitutional 
standing, explain Spokeo, and summarize a host of post-Spokeo digital pri-
vacy standing cases. These threads culminate in my contention that the pri-
vate enforcement mechanism must be created under state law. 
Second, the remedy must impose a fiduciary duty on entities that collect 
or retain personally identifiable information. Scholars have begun refining a 
framework for resolving information-related harms that minimizes potential 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016). 
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First Amendment hurdles.9 This framework establishes a fiduciary relation-
ship between users and the businesses that collect and retain their personally 
identifiable information. Below, I build on this work, arguing that states 
should enact legislation that would codify a tort for the breach of an infor-
mation fiduciary’s duty. This avenue is both good policy and sound strategy 
because it minimizes First Amendment arguments against vindicating infor-
mational harms. 
Third, defendants should be strictly liable for information misuse. Strict 
liability is appropriate when two conditions are met: First, strict liability is 
necessary when there is significant difficulty attributing liability under a 
standard negligence regime. This is true in the products liability context—
successfully establishing duty, breach, and cause is extremely difficult in the 
complex supply-chain environment of the modern economy. Second, strict 
liability is appropriate when the defendant is better able to discover the dan-
ger and has a superior ability to bear the costs of injury. This is also true in 
the products liability context, where the law holds manufacturers strictly lia-
ble because they are far better positioned to avoid and shoulder the cost of 
the harm. Below, I argue that information misuse satisfies both of these con-
ditions, and I build on other scholars’ work in this area to establish that breach 
of an information fiduciary’s duty should be treated as a strict liability tort. 
Fourth, the statute should prescribe a schedule of damages that begins 
with nominal damages and attorney’s fees for strict liability and ratchets up 
damages with a defendant’s culpability. Appropriately deployed, this so-
called private attorney general regime can be a powerful force that reshapes 
incentives. I argue below that private enforcement is particularly well-suited 
for information misuse. At the same time, the law should not effect a windfall 
for plaintiffs’ attorneys when tangible harm may be difficult to prove. 
In this Article I describe the reasons for each of these features in greater 
detail and then consider the benefits and drawbacks of this approach. These 
benefits include practical and logistical advantages and would also further 
three primary ends. First, this scheme will reshape incentives by internalizing 
the costs of information misuse. Second, this mechanism will, for the first 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 102–03 (2004) (“I posit that the law 
should hold that companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with us.”); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST 47 (2018) (“[T]he law of information 
privacy should be oriented toward buttressing . . . trust norms . . . when those with power (infor-
mation holders) violate the trust of those without (information sharers).”); Jack M. Balkin, Infor-
mation Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1210 (2016) (“Gener-
ally speaking, when the law prevents a fiduciary from disclosing or selling information about a 
client—or using information to a client’s disadvantage—this does not violate the First Amendment, 
even though the activity would be protected if there were no fiduciary relationship.”). 
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time, impose some substantial costs for excessive information retention. I ar-
gue that this is an unbridled benefit, and it is a goal that has been neglected 
in both scholarly and policy debates. Third, structuring the remedy this way 
will benefit the cybersecurity insurance market, thereby helping disperse in-
formation misuse costs in a more just and equitable way. 
When I use the terms “information misuse” and “data misuse,” I am using 
them expansively and to encompass at least four distinct things. First is data 
breaches by external actors. These include cases where users’ information is 
compromised by a nefarious actor outside the organization.10 Second is when 
an external actor misuses information. This includes the Cambridge Analyt-
ica scandal, where a Facebook app developer breached Facebook’s terms of 
service when he—under the auspices of academic research—collected users’ 
data and provided that trove of information to a for-profit political consulting 
firm.11 Third is when internal actors misuse information. This includes exam-
ples where employees use their privileges to exploit users’ information for 
illegitimate purposes that are unrelated to the business—such as Uber’s “God 
View” and Facebook’s termination of an employee who used his position to 
stalk women.12 And fourth is when the company itself uses data for an ille-
gitimate purpose. This includes, for example, Facebook’s practice of provid-
ing advertisers with users’ cell phone numbers, even when the company only 
acquired those numbers for multifactor authentication purposes.13 This fourth 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Glossary, NICCS, https://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary [https://perma.cc/98BV-624Y] (defin-
ing data breach as “[t]he unauthorized movement or disclosure of sensitive information to a party, 
usually outside the organization, that is not authorized to have or see the information”); id. (defining 
data theft as “[t]he deliberate or intentional act of stealing of information”). 
 11 See Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Mil-
lions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-ana-
lytica-trump-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/XJ4V-7LE5]. 
 12 See, e.g., Joseph Cox, Facebook Is Investigating a Claim That an Employee Used His Posi-
tion to Stalk Women, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 30, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_
us/article/kzxdny/facebook-investigating-employee-stalking-women-online [https://perma.cc/4J78-
B36E]; Kashmir Hill, ‘God View’: Uber Allegedly Stalked Users for Party-Goers’ Viewing Pleas-
ure, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/10/03/god-view-uber-
allegedly-stalked-users-for-party-goers-viewing-pleasure/ [https://perma.cc/KL8U-ZNZG]; Sam 
Levin, Facebook Fires Engineer Accused of Stalking, Possibly by Abusing Data Access, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/02/facebook-engi-
neer-fired-alleged-stalker-tinder [https://perma.cc/8A99-9WXJ]. 
 13 See Hill, Facebook Is Giving Advertisers Access to Your Shadow Contact Information, supra 
note 3; Giridhari Venkatadri et al., Investigating Sources of PII Used in Facebook’s Targeted Ad-
vertising, PROCEEDINGS ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS. (2019), https://mislove.org/publications/
PII-PETS.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG9J-LVCM]. 
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category also encompasses slightly different examples, such as when a com-
pany misrepresents to users (and regulators) that it’s protecting information 
more robustly than it actually is.14 
Part I of this Article summarizes the current information security regu-
latory environment.15 Part II explains that information misuse is a market 
failure.16 Part III proposes a solution for this market failure: create a state-
law cause of action for breach of an information fiduciary’s duty, impose 
nominal damages for strict liability, and ratchet up damages with culpabil-
ity.17 Part IV justifies each component of this proposal by explaining the ra-
tionale for using state law, for creating a fiduciary duty, for imposing strict 
liability, and for levying nominal damages.18 Part V examines the advantages 
of and challenges to this remedial scheme.19 
I. THE CURRENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Information security regulation in the United States is composed of a 
complicated patchwork of authorities. The following Sections in this Part will 
provide overviews of different regulatory regimes.20 Section A of this Part pro-
vides a brief overview of federal law authorities.21 Section B focuses on state 
law authorities.22 Section C offers an overview of foreign law authorities.23 
A. Federal Law 
There are many federal statutes that regulate information security in a 
limited way. I list a few of these sector-specific statutes first and then turn my 
attention to two slightly more robust regulators: the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See, e.g., Gabriel J.X. Dance et al., Facebook Gave Device Makers Deep Access to Data on 
Users and Friends, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/03/tech-
nology/facebook-device-partners-users-friends-data.html [https://perma.cc/NN6V-E9VD] (“But the 
partnerships [between Facebook and device manufacturers] . . . raise concerns about the company’s 
privacy protections and compliance with a 2011 consent decree with the Federal Trade Commission. 
Facebook allowed the device companies access to the data of users’ friends without their explicit 
consent, even after declaring that it would no longer share such information with outsiders. Some 
device makers could retrieve personal information even from users’ friends who believed they had 
barred any sharing, The New York Times found.”). 
 15 See infra notes 23–118 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 120–138 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 141–155 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 160–318 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 323–348 and accompanying text. 
 20 This overview is not comprehensive and exhaustive, but it hits the high points. 
 21 See infra notes 24–63 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 64–102 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 103–118 and accompanying text. 
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1. Sector-Specific Federal Statutes 
Over time, Congress has enacted several statutes that regulate specific 
sectors’ information security practices. These include: 
• Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
(regulating healthcare information);24 
• Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, a.k.a. Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA) (regulating financial sector information);25 
• Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)26 and Federal Accurate Credit Trans-
actions Act (FACTA) (regulating consumer credit reporting infor-
mation);27 
• Privacy Act of 1974 (regulating government record retention prac-
tices);28 
• Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (regulating internet-
collected information about children);29 
• Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (regulating educa-
tion records);30 and 
• Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (regulating electronic 
communications and law enforcement).31 
Excluded from this list but detailed below are consumer protection regula-
tions by the FTC and investor protection regulations by the SEC. 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 25 Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999 (GLBA), Pub. L. No. 
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). In 2019, the 
FTC proposed significant amendments to two of GLBA’s privacy-related implementing regulations: 
the Privacy Rule and the Safeguards Rule. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule Under 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 13,150 (proposed Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.federalregister.
gov/documents/2019/04/04/2019-06039/privacy-of-consumer-financial-information-rule-under-the-
gramm-leach-bliley-act [https://perma.cc/G5CD-8WFC ] (Privacy Rule); Standards for Safeguarding 
Customer Information, 84 Fed. Reg. 13,158 (proposed Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.federalregis-
ter.gov/documents/2019/04/04/2019-04981/standards-for-safeguarding-customer-information 
[https://perma.cc/2F66-HJXD] (Safeguards Rule). 
 26 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (codified as amended 
in 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
 27 Federal Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 
1952 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.). 
 28 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a). 
 29 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681-728 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506). 
 30 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 88 Stat. 571 (cod-
ified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1231). 
 31 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codi-
fied as amended throughout 18 U.S.C.). 
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2. FTC Enforcement 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act outlaws “unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”32 and “empower[s] and 
direct[s]” the FTC to prevent persons and businesses from using deceptive 
and unfair trade practices.33 
Courts have given this simple prohibition an expansive interpretation, 
providing the FTC with a broad mandate to pursue companies that fail to 
adequately protect users’ and customers’ information.34 
The history of the FTC’s regulation of online privacy is complex.35 The 
FTC’s “privacy cases flow from the Agency’s decades-long experience and 
precedent in enforcing false advertising cases . . . [and] the FTC regularly 
borrows norms developed from the self-regulatory systems of industries and 
incorporates standards from statutory information privacy law to set stand-
ards under the FTC Act.”36 Since 1938, Congress has given the FTC two dis-
tinct forms of authority—the power to prevent “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in commerce.”37 FTC privacy law has thus been shaped by theories 
of unfairness and deception.38 
The FTC’s unfairness authority is governed by a three-part test, which 
requires that an unfair practice “(1) causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers (2) which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and (3) [is] not outweighed by the countervailing benefits to con-
sumers or to competition.”39 
The overwhelming majority of the FTC’s privacy enforcement actions 
have settled.40 In August 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 32 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 33 Id. § 45(a)(2). 
 34 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and Officers’ Cyber-
security Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1237–38, 1243–45 
(2017). 
 35 See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 145–92 (2016) (explaining the FTC’s approach to online privacy regulation); Daniel J. 
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
583, 585–89 (2014) (characterizing the FTC’s privacy settlements as a form of common law). 
 36 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 35, at 146. 
 37 See Pub. L. No. 75-477, 38 Stat. 717 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)). 
 38 HOOFNAGLE, supra note 35, at 119 (“Theories of unfairness and deception now form the 
basis of FTC privacy law.”).  
 39 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 40 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 35, at 606–07 (“In nearly all of the FTC’s Section 5 cases 
and complaints alleging violations of COPPA, GLBA, and the Safe Harbor Agreement, the final 
disposition of the matter is a settlement, default judgment, or abandonment of the action by the FTC 
in the investigatory stage. The result is that there are hardly any judicial decisions in this arena.”). 
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explicitly ratified the FTC’s unfair trade practice theory of cybersecurity lia-
bility in an action against Wyndham Worldwide Corp. for a series of ex-
tremely egregious information security failures.41 
The FTC’s most expansive theory of liability has recently come under 
assault. In 2013, the FTC instituted an enforcement action against LabMD, 
Inc., a medical testing company.42 The FTC alleged that the company inse-
curely stored patient information on a peer-to-peer network and argued that 
lax security practices were an unfair business practice.43 An administrative 
law judge ruled against the FTC, concluding that it had failed to show 
LabMD’s security practices had caused or were likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers.44 In July 2016, however, the FTC reversed the adminis-
trative law judge, concluding that “the very disclosure of sensitive personal 
medical information . . . itself represented substantial consumer injury.”45 
The company petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
which issued a unanimous opinion in June 2018 that vacated the FTC’s cease 
and desist order.46 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in LabMD, Inc. v. FTC is odd in a couple 
respects. First, the court did not squarely address whether LabMD’s failure 
to secure patient data constituted an unfair trade practice under Section 5(a). 
Instead, the court “assume[d] arguendo that the Commission is correct and 
that LabMD’s negligent failure to design and maintain a reasonable data-se-
curity program invaded consumers’ right of privacy and thus constituted an 
unfair act or practice.”47 Because the panel did not squarely confront the 
question of whether the FTC’s enforcement was within its statutory authority, 
the opinion neither cites nor discusses the Third Circuit’s Wyndham deci-
sion.48 Second, the court vacated the FTC’s cease and desist order, determin-
ing that the FTC’s remedy—a command that LabMD “overhaul and replace 
                                                                                                                           
 41 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245–47, 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding 
that Wyndham’s failure to secure consumer information, which resulted in actual harm to consum-
ers, fell within the plain meaning of “unfair”); see also William McGeveran, The Duty of Data 
Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1194 (2019) (“In the Wyndham case, for example, the FTC pre-
sented many allegations of atrocious data security practices by the defendant, including the use of 
out-of-the-box default passwords for servers Wyndham connected to a network, the storage of pay-
ment card data in plain text format, and a lack of firewalls and other elementary access controls.”). 
 42 See Complaint, In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2013 WL 523775, at *1 (F.T.C. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 43 See id. ¶¶ 17–21. 
 44 See In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033, at *9 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015) (“Com-
plaint Counsel has failed to prove the first prong of [section 45(n)’s] three-part test—that this alleged 
unreasonable conduct caused or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.”). 
 45 In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215, at *6 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016).  
 46 LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 47 Id. at 1231. 
 48 See generally id. 
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its data-security program to meet an indeterminable standard of reasonable-
ness”—was unenforceable because it was insufficiently specific.49 
It is uncertain how the FTC will proceed after the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion in LabMD. There is not a genuine circuit split between the Third Cir-
cuit and the Eleventh Circuit, so it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court 
will weigh in anytime soon. 
3. SEC Enforcement 
In 2011, the SEC published a guidance document about how federal se-
curities laws apply to data breaches and related instances of information mis-
use.50 The document notes that “federal securities laws, in part, are designed 
to elicit disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about 
risks and events that a reasonable investor would consider important to an 
investment decision.”51 Although it concedes that existing disclosure require-
ments do not expressly refer to cybersecurity incidents, the SEC still requires 
disclosure of “material information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber 
incidents” to prevent misleading the public.52 
The SEC updated and expanded the guidance in February 2018.53 The 
updated guidance says that companies must have “disclosure controls and 
procedures” in place “that provide an appropriate method of discerning the 
impact that such matters may have on the company and its business, financial 
condition, and results of operations.”54 Further, companies are expected “to 
disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents that are material to investors, in-
cluding the concomitant financial, legal, or reputational consequences.”55 
The SEC also notes that “an ongoing internal or external investigation—
which can often be lengthy—would not on its own provide a basis for avoid-
ing disclosures of a material cybersecurity incident.”56 And perhaps with an 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See id. at 1236. 
 50 Div. of Corp. Fin., CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2: Cybersecurity, U.S. SEC. & EX-
CHANGE COMM’N (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-
topic2.htm [https://perma.cc/HZ66-CG9V] [hereinafter SEC 2011 Cybersecurity Disclosure Guid-
ance]. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Commission Statement & Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 8166, Release Nos. 33-10459 & 34-82746 (Feb. 26, 2018) [hereinafter SEC 2018 Cybersecurity 
Disclosure Guidance], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-02-26/pdf/2018-03858.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X99K-HLXV]. 
 54 Id. at 8167. 
 55 Id. at 8169. 
 56 Id. 
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eye to perceptions of impropriety surrounding the Equifax data breach,57 the 
agency cautioned that “companies would be well served by considering how 
to avoid the appearance of improper trading during the period following an 
incident and prior to the dissemination of disclosure.”58 
In our analysis of the Yahoo data breaches, my coauthor and I correctly 
predicted that an SEC enforcement action was inevitable.59 In April 2018, the 
SEC “announced that the entity formerly known as Yahoo! Inc. has agreed to 
pay a $35 million penalty to settle charges that it misled investors by failing 
to disclose one of the world’s largest data breaches.”60 
Some have criticized the SEC because the disclosure standard is so elas-
tic, and action against Yahoo is unlikely to quell that criticism because Yahoo’s 
conduct was so egregious.61 The settlement is also so miniscule that it borders 
on meaningless: the Yahoo breach exposed three billion user accounts,62 mean-
ing that Yahoo paid about one penny for each exposed account.63 
B. State Law 
In the absence of comprehensive information security regulation at the 
federal level, states have taken the lead experimenting with broadly applicable 
cybersecurity laws. I discuss three types of state authority below: data security 
statutes, breach notification statutes, and recent statutory developments. 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Liz Moyer, Equifax Special Committee Says Executive Stock Sales Were in the Clear, 
CNBC (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/03/equifax-special-committee-says-execu-
tive-stock-sales-were-in-the-clear.html [https://perma.cc/B9KT-RZSV]. 
 58 SEC 2018 Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, supra note 53, at 8172. 
 59 See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 34, at 1284–85 (“[T]he SEC appears to have an ex-
ceedingly strong case in a future enforcement action against Yahoo. . . . There is very little, if any, 
language in the SEC’s 2011 Guidance that could excuse what currently appears to be a grave mis-
representation [in September 2016] to financial markets, Yahoo’s own investors, and the SEC.”). 
 60 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Altaba, Formerly Known as Yahoo!, Charged 
with Failing to Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees to Pay $35 Million (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71 [https://perma.cc/J3GC-PXAE]; see also Altaba 
Inc., f/d/b/a Yahoo!, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10485 (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2018/33-10485.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QQA-TNVJ]. 
 61 See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 34, at 1272 (quoting from a September 9, 2017 SEC 
filing that contains material misrepresentations); see, e.g., Peter J. Henning, S.E.C.’s New Cyberse-
curity Guidance Won’t Spur More Disclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/03/05/business/dealbook/sec-guidance-cybersecurity.html [https://perma.cc/6L34-
PNZ3]. 
 62 See Robert McMillan & Ryan Knutson, Yahoo Triples Estimate of Breached Accounts to 3 
Billion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-triples-estimate-of-breached-
accounts-to-3-billion-1507062804. 
 63 More precisely: $35,000,000 divided by 3,000,000,000 equals $0.01167. 
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Thirteen states currently have statutes that require private sector actors 
to take measures to protect information they collect. The states with data se-
curity statutes are: Arkansas,64 California,65 Florida,66 Indiana,67 Kansas,68 
Maryland,69 Massachusetts,70 Nevada,71 New Mexico,72 Oregon,73 Rhode Is-
land,74 Texas,75 and Utah.76 
These statutes are broadly similar, though not monolithic.77 They usu-
ally apply to businesses that collect, maintain, store, or process personal in-
formation.78 The laws also typically require that covered entities implement 
and maintain reasonable security practices to protect personal information 
from unauthorized access, use, modification, or disclosure.79 
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 
Virgin Islands have enacted breach notification statutes. These laws generally 
require private and public actors to notify individuals about security breaches 
that involve the individuals’ personally identifiable information.80 
                                                                                                                           
 64 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104 (2011). 
 65 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West 2009 & Supp. 2019). 
 66 FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2) (West 2017). 
 67 IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5 (West 2018). 
 68 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6, 139(b) (Supp. 2018). 
 69 MD. CODE COM. LAW §§ 14-3501 to -3503 (LexisNexis 2013). 
 70 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 2(a) (Supp. 2019); see also infra Part II.A.2. 
 71 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.210, 603A.215(2) (2005). 
 72 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-4 (Supp. 2018). 
 73 OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.622 (2017). 
 74 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.3-2 (Supp. 2018). 
 75 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.052 (West 2015). 
 76 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-101, -201, -301 (LexisNexis 2013). 
 77 For a comparison of these data security statutes, see Data Security Laws | Private Sector, 
NCSL (May 29, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-tech-
nology/data-security-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/VC2R-GEPF]. 
 78 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6, 139(b)(1) (2016) (defining a “holder of personal infor-
mation” to mean “a person who, in the ordinary course of business, collects, maintains or possesses, 
or causes to be collected, maintained or possessed, the personal information of any other person”). 
 79 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-4 (requiring an owner of personal information to “im-
plement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the 
information to protect the personal identifying information from unauthorized access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure”). 
 80 For a list of all fifty-four breach notification laws (including statutory citations), see Security 
Breach Notification Laws, NCSL (Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/MA2V-FL8M]. 
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Most of these laws follow a similar pattern: they articulate what kind of 
entities are required to issue breach notifications,81 they define what consti-
tutes personally identifiable information82 and what constitutes a breach,83 
and they provide notification requirements and exemptions.84 
There have been two recent developments in statehouses worth men-
tioning—in Vermont and in California. 
In May 2018, Vermont enacted a first-in-the-nation regulation oversee-
ing data brokers.85 The law defines “brokered personal information” to in-
clude one or more of the following digitized records about a consumer, if 
organized for dissemination to third parties: names, addresses, dates of birth, 
places of birth, mothers’ maiden names, unique biometric data, names and 
addresses of immediate family members, and other information that “would 
allow a reasonable person to identify the consumer with reasonable cer-
tainty.”86 And it defines “data broker” to mean “a business . . . that knowingly 
collects and sells or licenses to third parties the brokered personal information 
of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship.”87 
The law also provides examples of what constitutes a direct relationship and 
some specific exclusions.88 
The legislation has five primary provisions: (1) it eliminates fees for 
credit freezes, (2) it requires data brokers to register, (3) it imposes security 
standards on data brokers, (4) it requires data brokers to report breaches, and 
(5) it requires data brokers to state their policies on opting out. Much of the 
law took effect on January 1, 2019.89 
Meanwhile, in California, an Oakland-based real estate developer 
named Alastair Mactaggart initiated an effort in 2017 to enact a new state-
                                                                                                                           
 81 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65(a) (2009) (requiring “[a]ny business that owns or licenses 
personal information of residents of North Carolina or any business that conducts business in North 
Carolina that owns or licenses personal information in any form (whether computerized, paper, or 
otherwise) shall provide notice” of a security breach); id. § 75-61 (providing definitions). 
 82 See, e.g., id. § 75-61(10) (defining “personal information”). 
 83 See, e.g., id. § 75-61(14) (defining “security breach”). 
 84 See, e.g., id. § 75-65(d)–(e) (prescribing requirements of notice). 
 85 See H. 764, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2018), https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/sta-
tus/2018/H.764 [https://perma.cc/QYX3-CEWX] (reporting that the bill was enacted without the 
governor’s signature on May 22, 2018). 
 86 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430 (1)(A). 
 87 Id. § 2430(4)(A). 
 88 Id. § 2430(4)(B)-(C). 
 89 See H. 764 § 7(b); see also VT. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., GUIDANCE ON VERMONT’S ACT 
171 OF 2018 DATA BROKER REG. (2018), https://ago.vermont.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
2018-12-11-VT-Data-Broker-Regulation-Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH56-HBXB]. 
2019] A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse 1907 
law digital privacy statute using California’s ballot initiative mechanism.90 
The ballot initiative had three primary components: First, it proposed to give 
consumers the right to request that companies disclose what data the com-
pany has collected on the consumer.91 Second, it proposed to give consumers 
the right to demand that companies not sell their data or share it with third 
parties for business purposes.92 Third, it proposed to give consumers the right 
to sue or fine companies that violate the law.93 By March 2018, the ballot 
initiative had amassed over 600,000 signatures, well above the 366,000 min-
imum required for the measure to appear on the November 2018 ballot.94 
In June 2018, however, in exchange for Mr. Mactaggart’s agreement to 
revoke the ballot initiative, California’s state legislature enacted a digital pri-
vacy statute that was modeled on the ballot initiative.95 The new law gives 
consumers the right to know what information a company is collecting about 
them, why the company is collecting the information, and with whom the 
company plans to share that information.96 Consumers may also demand that 
a company delete their information or demand that a company not sell or 
share their information.97 Further, the law forbids companies from discrimi-
nating against consumers who exercise their rights under the law.98 The stat-
ute is scheduled to go into effect in January 2020.99 
There is one glaring difference between the proposed ballot initiative 
and the legislature-enacted law: the latter does not provide consumers the 
right to file suit against companies that do not comply with the law.100 Instead, 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Silicon Valley Faces Regulatory Fight on Its Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/california-data-privacy-ballot-meas-
ure.html [https://perma.cc/P33J-MHNC]. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Press Release, Californians for Consumer Privacy, California Consumer Privacy Act Clears 
Major Hurdle: Submits 629,000 Signatures Statewide (May 3, 2018), https://www.caprivacy.org/post/
california-consumer-privacy-act-clears-major-hurdle-submits-625-000-signatures-statewide [https://
perma.cc/3AEV-B8UG]. 
 95 Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2lEdwdX [https://perma.cc/2S98-LNUN]. 
 96 A. B. 375 § 2(i), 2017–2018 State Assemb. (Cal. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375 [https://perma.cc/9X7Z-4FAS]. 
 97 See id. § 1798.105. 
 98 See id. § 1798.125. 
 99 See id. § 1798.198. 
 100 There is, however, an ongoing fight to add a private enforcement provision to the law. See 
Jill Cowan, The Fight Over a Landmark Digital Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/digital-privacy-hannah-beth-jackson-ccpa.html [https://perma.
cc/ELT4-TLC3] (interviewing the bill’s sponsor, Cal. State Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson). 
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the new law gives the California Attorney General some new authority to fine 
companies that fail to comply.101 
The California Consumer Privacy Act, as the new law is known, repre-
sents the most significant domestic substantive digital privacy law success-
fully enacted to date. But as I argue at length throughout this Article, stripping 
out the right of private enforcement is both telling and significant.102 
C. Foreign Law 
On April 14, 2016, the European Parliament approved the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).103 The GDPR replaced Directive 95/46/EC—
known as the Data Privacy Directive—and the GDPR went into effect on 
May 25, 2018.104 
The European Union’s GDPR is relevant to this survey of the domestic 
regulatory environment for two primary reasons. First, it is the broadest and 
most aggressive form of data privacy regulation to date.105 Second, it has sig-
nificant extraterritorial reach because GDPR standards apply to the personal 
information of EU Internet users no matter the location of the entity that pos-
sesses the information.106 
The GDPR defines “personal data” as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person.”107 The GDPR guarantees several 
privacy rights to EU Internet users; these include the right to be notified about 
a security breach,108 the right to access information,109 the right to erasure 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See, e.g., A. B. 375 § 1798.150. 
 102 One need not be particularly cynical to understand why the technology lobby trained its 
most strenuous objection on the ballot initiative’s private right of enforcement. See, e.g., infra Part 
II.A. 
 103 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR], 
https://gdpr-info.eu/ [https://perma.cc/2G8Z-5PVM]. 
 104 See id., Recital No. 171. 
 105 See Chris Mirasola, Summary: The EU General Data Protection Regulation, LAWFARE (Mar. 
1, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-eu-general-data-protection-regulation [https://perma.
cc/JSF3-5W5X]; Adam Satariano, What the G.D.P.R., Europe’s Tough New Data Law, Means for 
You, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/technology/gdpr-european-
privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/Y23L-C59K]. 
 106 GDPR, supra note 103, Recital No. 23; GDPR FAQs, https://www.eugdpr.org/gdpr-faqs.
html [https://perma.cc/795E-4S4J] (“[GDPR] applies to all companies processing and holding the 
personal data of data subjects residing in the European Union, regardless of the company’s loca-
tion.”). 
 107 See GDPR, supra note 103, Art. 4(1). 
 108 See id., Art. 33. 
 109 See id., Art. 15. 
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(a.k.a. the right to be forgotten),110 and the right to data portability,111 among 
others.112 
The GDPR has strong consent requirements. “Consent should be given 
by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of [a person’s] agreement to the processing of per-
sonal data relating to him or her.”113 For some categories of information (e.g., 
race, political opinion, religious belief, genetic information, biometric data) 
explicit, affirmative consent (opt-in) is required.114 
Violations of the GDPR may result in harsh penalties: Authorities may 
impose administrative fines of up to four percent of a company’s global an-
nual revenue for some violations of the GDPR’s provisions.115 
There is significant uncertainty about the GDPR’s applicability and 
scope.116 Many companies have been under pressure to make the features 
required by the GDPR a global baseline.117 But so far, companies have not 
adopted global GDPR compliance. In January 2019, France announced the 
first major GDPR penalty against Google for $57 million.118 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See id., Art. 17. 
 111 See id., Art. 20. 
 112 See, e.g., id., Art. 16 (right to rectification); id., Art. 18 (right to restriction of processing); 
id., Art. 21 (right to object). 
 113 Id., Recital No. 32. 
 114 See id., Art. 9. 
 115 See id., Art. 83(5)–(6). This could result in significant penalties for the wealthiest companies. 
For example, Facebook could be fined $1.63 billion for a 2018 security breach. See Sam Schechner, 
Facebook Faces Potential $1.63 Billion Fine in Europe Over Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-faces-potential-1-63-billion-fine-in-europe-over-data-
breach-1538330906; see also infra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that Google faced a 
GDPR fine of up to $4.7 billion). 
 116 See, e.g., Nick Ismail, GDPR Uncertainty and Confusion Remains, INFO. AGE (Sept. 13, 
2017), http://www.information-age.com/gdpr-uncertainty-remains-123468541/ [https://perma.cc/
2HVM-CTZK] (discussing findings from a survey that says thirty-seven percent of respondents do 
not know whether their companies need to comply with GDPR and twenty-eight percent believe 
they do not need to comply). 
 117 See, e.g., Natasha Lomas, Facebook Urged to Make GDPR Its “Baseline Standard” Glob-
ally, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 9, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/09/facebook-urged-to-make-
gdpr-its-baseline-standard-globally/ [https://perma.cc/ZS8P-NQ7X]. This phenomenon is some-
times referred to as the “Brussels Effect,” which “operates principally as a de facto mechanism, 
when market actors conform their global products to European rule.” See Anupam Chander et al., 
Catalyzing Privacy Law, GEO. L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS & OTHER WORKS, 10–11 (2019), https://
scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3208&context=facpub [https://perma.
cc/78W9-D4BK]. 
 118 Tony Romm, France Fines Google Nearly $57 Million for First Major Violation of New 
European Privacy Regime, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
europe/france-fines-google-nearly-57-million-for-first-major-violation-of-new-european-privacy-
regime/2019/01/21/89e7ee08-1d8f-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html. 
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II. INFORMATION MISUSE AS A MARKET FAILURE 
Despite this patchwork of authorities derived from federal, state, and for-
eign law, data breaches and information misuse remain a constant and pervasive 
phenomenon of modern life.119 Section A of this Part models investment in in-
formation security as a function of profit and cost.120 Section B uses that model 
to identify what is animating these pervasive information security failings.121 
A. Security, Profit, and Cost 
In my investigation and analysis of the Yahoo data breaches, a pair of 
anecdotes looms large. First, in 2014, Yahoo’s then-new Chief Information 
Security Officer Alex Stamos pressed senior management to adopt end-to-
end encryption for the company’s entire digital infrastructure.122 Yahoo’s 
then-Senior Vice President Jeff Bonforte balked; because end-to-end encryp-
tion would block the company from indexing and searching the contents of 
users’ message data, Bonforte argued that the company should not lose the 
ability to use that data to tailor advertisements.123 
Second, following disclosure to senior management of a system-wide ex-
filtration of users’ email accounts, Yahoo’s then-CEO Marissa Mayer refused to 
implement one of the most basic security measures that security experts consider 
standard practice following a breach: automatically resetting all users’ pass-
words.124 Mayer’s rationale for rejecting this fundamental staple of data breach 
response was derived from a “fear that even something as simple as a password 
change would drive Yahoo’s shrinking email users to other services.”125 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See supra notes 20–118 and accompanying text. 
 120 Other scholars have helpfully used economic concepts and models to elucidate the market 
forces around privacy. See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of 
Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2015) (explaining that the loss of privacy and obscurity 
is a function of the decreased transaction costs of surveillance and information collection); Obscu-
rity Settings: Episode 58, ORAL ARGUMENT (Apr. 24, 2015), https://oralargument.org/58 [https://
perma.cc/C57E-RYR6]; see infra notes 122–128 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 129–138 and accompanying text. 
 122 Nicole Perlroth & Vindu Goel, Defending Against Hackers Took a Back Seat at Yahoo, 
Insiders Say, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/technology/yahoo-
data-breach-hacking.html [https://perma.cc/H3LR-MUXA]. 
 123 Id. For his part, Mr. Bonforte later confirmed this report. Answering a question about his 
resistance to Mr. Stamos’s end-to-end encryption effort, Mr. Bonforte replied, “I’m not particularly 
thrilled with building an apartment building which has the biggest bars on every window.” Id.; see 
also Victoria L. Schwartz, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1697 
(2016) (arguing that another reason why corporations fail to adequately safeguard personal infor-
mation is due to corporate executives’ “reduced privacy preference[s],” which may lead them to 
“undervalue or not even recognize the privacy implications of their business decisions”). 
 124 Perlroth & Goel, supra note 122. 
 125 Id. 
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These two anecdotes starkly demonstrate the trade-off between profit 
and security. Too-little security can cost an organization. Examples here in-
clude data breaches and damaging disclosures of information misuse. These 
have direct costs (e.g., defending against litigation and enforcement actions) 
and opportunity costs (e.g., dissuading potential users and customers from 
using the company’s services because of its abysmal security practices). 
But less well-explored is that too-much security can also prove costly. 
How? Mayer’s and Bonforte’s resistance to standard security practices is illus-
trative: Investing too heavily in security also has both direct costs (outlays for 
security services, software, vendors, and employees) and opportunity costs—
such as diminished usability (restricting account recovery options and abili-
ties,126 instituting multi-factor authentication, requiring complex passwords) 
and lost revenue streams (end-to-end encryption thwarting tailored marketing). 
In my analysis of the Yahoo data breaches, I developed a simple model 
to capture this trade-off.127 It expresses investment in information security as 
a function of a company’s profit: 
Figure 1: The Profit-Maximizing Model of Security 
 
But the model is not limited to for-profit companies.128 Security invest-
ment can also be expressed as a function of cost: 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Feigning forgotten login credentials is one of the most tried and true ways that hackers 
exploit vulnerabilities and gain access to user accounts. Companies have responded by making it 
more difficult to reset login credentials, but this has the side effect of keeping out legitimate users 
too. See, e.g., Advanced Protection Program, GOOGLE, https://landing.google.com/ad-
vancedprotection/ [https://perma.cc/FMM9-G8AP] (“If you have lost both keys and do not have 
access to a logged-in session, you will need to submit a request to recover your account. It will take 
a few days for Google to verify it’s you and grant you access to your account.”). 
 127 See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 34, at 1289–91. 
 128 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The Basics, 52 AKRON L. 
REV. 971, 1033–35 (2019). 
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Figure 2: The Cost-Minimizing Model of Security 
 
The top and bottom of the parabolas, respectively, are the equilibria. In 
the former, the top of the parabola is the profit-maximization amount of se-
curity; in the latter, the bottom of the parabola is the cost-minimization 
amount of security. In both, any more or any less security would lower the 
company’s profit and increase its costs. A failure to invest in enough security 
is a left-side disequilibrium, or “too-little security disequilibrium.” And in-
vesting in too much security is a right-side disequilibrium, or “too-much se-
curity disequilibrium.” 
B. Disequilibrium and Information Misuse 
Too-little security disequilibrium and too-much security disequilibrium 
present distinct challenges to organizations. But society collectively spends 
much more time concerned with the former versus the latter. Why? 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that it is unlikely that too-
much security disequilibrium is more costly and dire—if anything, the oppo-
site may be true. Nearly every metric of losses to identity theft increases year-
over-year, sometimes by double-digit percentages.129 In 2017, there were an 
average of 245 curated breaches each month, or eight curated breaches each 
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day.130 Of 8.7 billion raw records exposed in 2017, over three billion were 
real and unique identities—a sixty-four percent increase from 2016.131 Ap-
proximately 15.4 million Americans were victims of identity theft in 2016, a 
sixteen percent increase over 2015.132 In 2017, that number was at least 16.7 
million.133 In 2015, identity thieves stole $15.5 billion, which increased to 
$16.2 billion in 2016 and $16.8 billion in 2017.134 And identity theft alone 
does not capture the full range of costs and harms that information misuse 
inflicts on consumers and users.135 
Rather, there are three primary differences—or asymmetries—between 
too-little security and too-much security disequilibria: who bears the cost, the 
variability of the marginal cost, and information imperfection. Together, these 
asymmetries foster a lopsided incentive structure that favors too-little secu-
rity. 
 First, information misuse (i.e., too-little security disequilibrium) does 
cost companies, but the company does not exclusively bear those costs. In-
stead, the costs of too-little security disequilibrium are shared between the 
company and the consumers whose information is misused or compro-
mised—a classic negative externality.136 
“[T]he incentive for most firms is to invest in very basic security—only 
enough to secure their systems from casual attackers—and otherwise pay no 
attention to security.”137 Even upon widespread adoption of breach notifica-
tion laws, “firms still do not face substantial incentives to adopt strong secu-
rity practices,” which “is in part because there is still little likelihood that a 
firm will be held liable for damages resulting from a data breach.”138 
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In contrast, the costs of too-much security disequilibrium are shouldered 
by the company alone: Shareholders, not consumers, suffer from duplicative 
spending on security services and lost opportunities to monetize information 
within the company’s reach. More to the point, these metrics are easy to 
measure and simple to tweak to satisfy shareholders’ interests—which is to 
say that they are self-correcting. Too-much security disequilibrium is less 
likely to persist because a company’s management (in discharging their fidu-
ciary duties to shareholders) has strong incentives to correct them and they 
are comparatively easy to correct. 
 Second, to be sure, both types of disequilibria are difficult to assess ex 
ante. But the stakes for too-little security disequilibrium are considerably 
higher. In other words, the marginal cost of too-much security disequilibrium 
is relatively low and consistent. On the other hand, the marginal cost of too-
little security disequilibrium is extremely variable: spending one fewer dollar 
on security may cost the company nothing, or it may be the dollar that would 
have averted a massive data breach. 
The result is a second asymmetry. Over time, shareholders and their fi-
duciaries are likely to exert persistent, incremental downward pressure on 
information security spending—particularly if the company has not suffered 
from an information misuse incident during the relevant period. The Yahoo 
anecdotes starkly illustrate this dynamic. Only after a costly misuse incident 
will there be any pressure to invest in greater security. 
 Third, imperfect information also likely plays a role in the prevalence 
of too-little security disequilibrium. This is a third asymmetry: shareholders 
and management can more easily measure the cost of too-much security dis-
equilibrium than too-little security disequilibrium. Losses from an infor-
mation misuse incident are impossible to predict. Some of the potential vari-
ables include how many people the misuse affects; the magnitude of the mis-
use; competition in the relevant market; the bad publicity; the reputational 
harm; the expenditures on lawyers, litigation, investigation, and penalties; the 
likelihood of class action litigation’s success; and more. 
In sum, there are significant differences between what happens when a 
company spends too little on security versus when a company spends too 
much on security. The takeaway is that too-little security disequilibrium—
i.e., data breaches and other episodes of information misuse—are far more 
likely to occur, and they are more likely to reoccur. 
III. A PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT REMEDY 
Public policy should change and seek to correct information misuse dise-
quilibrium. In this Part, I propose a specific form for that change: one or more 
states should enact legislation that imposes a fiduciary duty on anyone who 
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collects or retains personally identifiable information. The legislation should 
create a cause of action for breach of that duty, impose strict liability on viola-
tors of the duty, and prescribe damages that increase with a defendant’s culpa-
bility. I refer to this remedial scheme as a private enforcement remedy. 
Section A of this Part describes the proposed right and the proposed rem-
edy.139 Section B provides the rationale for each component of the proposed 
remedial scheme.140 
A. The Right 
One or more states should enact legislation that imposes a fiduciary duty 
on any entity that collects, retains, processes, sells, or shares personal infor-
mation. I refer to covered entities as information fiduciaries and refer to a 
person whose information is collected as the principal. 
 The statute should impose several duties on information fiduciaries, 
some general and others specific. General duties include analogs to other fi-
duciary relationships, like a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, a duty to use the 
information for the principal’s benefit and not to the principal’s disad-
vantage.141 
These general duties should give rise to concrete rules in specific situa-
tions. For starters, the principal should have primary discretion about whether 
he or she wants an information fiduciary to collect and retain a given piece 
of information, which means explicit opt-in rather than opt-out. This also 
means that an information fiduciary should only use a principal’s personally 
identifiable information in a way that the principal has explicitly opted in to. 
So, if an information fiduciary wants to use a principal’s information for a 
new, different, or otherwise unauthorized use, the information fiduciary 
should be required to obtain new, explicit, opt-in consent. Ideally, the right of 
the private enforcement remedy would require opt-in consent requirements 
which would mirror the express consent requirements of the GDPR.142 
 The statute should also expressly set the standard of care for information 
misuse. Massachusetts, for example, has adopted regulations under its infor-
mation security statute that prescribe a process-based approach to infor-
mation security.143 I have written elsewhere about these Written Information 
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Security Protocols (WISPs),144 and the Massachusetts regulation is an illus-
trative example of how a jurisdiction could use the WISP framework to set 
the relevant standard of care for information misuse. Under the regulation, 
covered entities must “develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive 
information security program that is written in one or more readily accessible 
parts and contains administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.”145 The 
regulation also includes some specific procedural requirements, like desig-
nating a security officer, regularly monitoring and updating the program, and 
documenting any responsive actions.146 A Massachusetts regulatory agency 
created a data security compliance checklist and a frequently asked questions 
document to help businesses comply with these requirements.147 As several 
scholars have noted, over time, a nebulous “reasonableness” requirement has 
increasingly given way to concrete rules for data security compliance.148 
Breach notification laws should also be expanded to require notice for 
all types of information misuse. As detailed below, robust breach notification 
is critical, because receipt of notification would be sufficient to establish strict 
liability. Incentives under the current state of affairs and under this proposal 
strongly discourage a company discovering a breach.149 
The GDPR punishes failure to notify harshly, which has the advantage 
of reshaping incentives in favor of prompt breach discovery and notification. 
This remedial scheme should also provide users with the ability to seek pu-
nitive damages for a company’s noncompliance with broad information mis-
use notification requirements. 
Plaintiffs should thus be empowered to sue to enforce two complementary 
rights—breach of an information fiduciary duty and failure to notify—and the 
culpability schedule detailed below should apply to both of these rights. 
B. The Remedy 
The structure of the remedy is perhaps more important than the specific 
contours of an information fiduciary’s duties. Why? For one, many laws—
both federal and state—impose some requirements on those who collect and 
retain information. The problem is a dearth of remedies.150 
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2019] A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse 1917 
 The breach of an information fiduciary’s duty should be enforceable by 
anyone whose information is misused. As an information fiduciary becomes 
more culpable for a breach, the penalties should ratchet up. Here is a proposed 
schedule: 
Figure 3: Proposed Penalty Schedule 
Culpability Primary Penalty Secondary Penalty 
Strict Liability • Nominal damages paid to litigants; or 
• Declaratory judgment; or 
• A judicially determined penalty constituting 
“meaningful deterrence” that is paid to the state treasury 
Reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs 
Negligence • Statutorily prescribed compensatory damages 
paid to the affected class, or, alternatively, paid to the 
litigants and to the state treasury; and/or 
• A judicially determined penalty constituting 
“meaningful deterrence” that is paid to the state treasury 
Reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs 
Recklessness • Statutorily prescribed compensatory damages 
paid to the affected class, or, alternatively, paid to the 
litigants and to the state treasury; and 
• A judicially determined penalty constituting 
“meaningful deterrence” that is paid to the state treasury 
Reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs 
Knowledge and 
purpose  
• Statutorily prescribed compensatory damages 
and punitive damages paid to the affected class, or, al-
ternatively, paid to the litigants and to the state treasury; 
and 
• A judicially determined penalty constituting 
“meaningful deterrence” that is paid to the state treasury 
Reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs 
Under this schedule, an information fiduciary is strictly liable for infor-
mation misuse. But strict liability may result in only nominal damages (or a 
declaratory judgment). In other words, companies that misuse information 
must pay private attorneys general to sue them; if discovery in that litigation 
reveals no more culpability than strict liability, then the information fiduciary 
may be liable for reasonable attorney’s fees and little else.151 If, however, the 
trial judge determines that nominal damages and reasonable attorney’s fees 
would not constitute a meaningful deterrent against future information mis-
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use, the judge should be empowered to order a penalty fee that would consti-
tute a meaningful deterrent, which the company would pay to the state treas-
ury.152 
If discovery uncovers negligence, then the defendant is liable for rea-
sonable attorney’s fees and statutorily prescribed compensatory damages. 
The defendant should pay these damages to the affected class, or—if distri-
bution to the class is impracticable—the defendant should compensate the 
named plaintiffs and pay the remaining damages to the state treasury.153 The 
judicially determined “meaningful deterrent” mechanism should also apply 
as a fallback option here. 
If, instead, discovery uncovers recklessness, the information fiduciary 
is liable for reasonable attorney’s fees, statutorily prescribed compensatory 
damages paid to the affected class (or to named plaintiffs and the treasury), 
plus an additional penalty fee owed to the state treasury. Further, if discovery 
uncovers knowledge or purposefulness, then the defendant is liable for both 
statutorily prescribed compensatory and punitive damages paid to the af-
fected class (or to named plaintiffs and the treasury), a penalty fee paid to the 
state treasury, plus reasonable attorney’s fees. 
The appeal of this proposed schedule has everything to do with influ-
encing information fiduciaries’ behavior and deterring information misuse; 
compensating victims of information misuse is an ancillary benefit. 
This remedial scheme differs from other contexts that use strict liability 
in one important respect. In products liability, the plaintiff obtains compen-
satory damages upon establishing strict liability, so there is no reason to argue 
for negligence in the alternative. Under this proposal, a plaintiff should be 
entitled to argue in the alternative for both negligence and strict liability be-
cause the differing levels of culpability result in differing levels of damages. 
The Third Restatement of Torts argues that courts should not submit to 
the fact-finder multiple differently labeled theories of liability using identical 
facts because allowing “two or more factually identical risk-utility claims to 
go to a jury under different labels . . . would generate confusion and may well 
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result in inconsistent verdicts.”154 In other words, the plaintiff in a products 
liability case should not be permitted to argue that the defendant is strictly 
liable, or, in the alternative, that the defendant was negligent. At the same 
time, the Restatement acknowledges that “as long as the requisites [of strict 
liability] are met, the plaintiff may in appropriate instances—for example, in 
connection with comparative fault or punitive damage claims—show that the 
defect resulted from reckless, willfully indifferent, or intentionally wrongful 
conduct of the defendant.”155 
The proposed information misuse remedy would allow the plaintiff to 
argue in the alternative for any combination of culpability. The Restatement’s 
concerns are legitimate when plaintiffs already obtain compensatory dam-
ages under strict liability, but they are inapposite here. With information mis-
use, defendants will have a statutory obligation to notify users about instances 
of information misuse. The fact that a company has notified users is, by itself, 
enough to establish strict liability. But that strict liability may only result in 
nominal damages; plaintiffs will need to establish greater culpability to re-
cover compensatory damages. Following discovery and litigation under this 
scheme, the plaintiff should be free to argue that the defendant was, for ex-
ample, negligent or reckless, and different findings of culpability are accom-
panied by statutorily prescribed damages. 
In sum, plaintiffs in products liability obtain compensatory damages 
upon establishing strict liability, so arguing for negligence promotes confu-
sion without any accompanying change in damages. Here, strict liability only 
imposes nominal damages, so plaintiffs should be permitted to argue for neg-
ligence and its accompanying compensatory damages. 
∗ ∗ ∗ 
The proposed remedial scheme has four essential components: it should 
be created under state law; it should impose a fiduciary duty on entities that 
collect or retain personally identifiable information; it should hold defendants 
strictly liable for information misuse; and it should prescribe a schedule of 
damages that begins with nominal damages and attorney’s fees for strict lia-
bility and ratchets up damages with a defendant’s culpability. 
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS 
This Part provides the rationale for each of the four essential compo-
nents of the private enforcement remedy described in the previous section. 
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Section A of this Part discusses why the private enforcement remedy must be 
enacted and implemented under state law.156 Section B argues that the private 
enforcement remedy should impose a fiduciary duty on entities that collect 
and use information about users.157 Section C asserts that this fiduciary duty 
must be combined with the imposition of strict liability to give the tort some 
teeth.158 Section D discusses why the private enforcement remedy should 
only impose nominal damages.159 
A. Why State Law? 
The private enforcement remedy should be enacted and implemented 
under state law. Federal courts, led by the U.S. Supreme Court, have narrowly 
interpreted the “injury-in-fact” requirement of Article III’s “case or contro-
versy” requirement. This slender interpretation of justiciable disputes sharply 
limits Congress’s ability to create private enforcement vehicles.160 And per-
haps more to the point, uncertainty about whether a litigant has standing in a 
data misuse case would wholly undermine the deterrence and incentive-alter-
ing purposes of the remedy. 
1. Statutory Standing Before Spokeo 
The Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence has two distinct strains that 
conflict with one another.161 On the one hand is Proposition A: “that the con-
tent of an injury is shaped by law, and therefore by Congress.”162 On the other 
is Proposition B: that some of Congress’s attempts to shape and create inju-
ries by statute violate Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.163 
The Court’s 1998 decision in FEC v. Akins provides an instructive ex-
ample of Proposition A.164 In that case, a group of voters brought suit against 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to challenge the FEC’s determina-
tion that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a 
“political committee” within the meaning of a statute and thus not subject to 
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disclosure requirements.165 The Court held that the challengers had standing 
because “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ that [the challengers] have suffered consists of 
their inability to obtain information . . . that on [their] view of the law, the 
statute requires that AIPAC make public.”166 
The Court rejected the FEC’s argument that the challengers had only a 
“generalized grievance,” because that concern “invariably appears in cases 
where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract 
and indefinite nature.”167 It acknowledged that a widely shared injury is often 
correlated with an abstract injury but concluded that “their association is not 
invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court 
has found ‘injury in fact.’”168 To support that conclusion, the majority analo-
gized the challenger’s position to an example where “large numbers of indi-
viduals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort).”169 
The most prominent example of Proposition B is Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, which the Court decided in 1992, a few years before Akins.170 Lujan 
denied standing to an environmental group that sought to challenge a regula-
tion under the Endangered Species Act.171 The Court flatly rejected the sug-
gestion that Congress could use a citizen-suit provision to create a right to 
have the Executive Branch observe the procedures required by the statute. 
The Court noted: “[T]here is absolutely no basis for making the Article III 
inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right,” because it would violate 
separation-of-power principles “[t]o permit Congress to convert the undiffer-
entiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an 
‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts.”172 
In 2009, the Court came to the same conclusion in Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute.173 Summers closely resembles Lujan: An environmental 
group sued to challenge a procedural defect in an environmental regulation. 
But the Court’s conclusion seemed to sweep far more broadly than procedural 
compliance in environmental law; as the Court stated, “[i]t makes no differ-
ence that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress.”174 
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2. Spokeo v. Robins: An Unresolved Tension 
In 2016, the Court decided Spokeo v. Robins.175 Spokeo asked whether 
the plaintiff had Article III standing under a provision of the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act (FCRA) that creates a private right of action.176 Specifically, the 
FCRA provides that “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any 
requirement [of the FCRA] with respect to any [individual] is liable to that 
[individual].”177 The statute prescribes damages where the non-complying 
agency is liable to the individual for either actual damages or statutory dam-
ages of $100 to $1,000 per violation, plus attorney’s fees, costs, and poten-
tially punitive damages.178 In Spokeo, the defendant, a consumer reporting 
agency, made numerous inaccurate representations about the plaintiff, includ-
ing “that he is married, has children, is in his 50s, has a job, is relatively 
affluent, and holds a graduate degree.”179 According to the plaintiff, all of that 
information was false.180 
The district court dismissed the complaint, but the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had standing.181 The 
panel noted that Article III limits Congress’s power to confer standing but 
that “the violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to 
confer standing.”182 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had suffered suf-
ficient harm because he alleged that the defendant “violated his statutory 
rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and because his interests 
“in the handling of his credit information are individualized rather than col-
lective.”183 
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded 
the case, determining that the panel’s “analysis focused on the second char-
acteristic (particularity), but it overlooked the first (concreteness).”184 
The tension between Proposition A and Proposition B is palpable in the 
Court’s opinion. On the one hand, the Court noted that “Congress cannot 
erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to 
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”185 On the other 
hand, the Court acknowledged that “Congress has the power to define injuries 
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and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before.”186 According to the majority, “Congress may el-
evate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries 
that were previously inadequate in law.”187 
In his majority opinion, Justice Alito held that “[c]oncreteness . . . is 
quite different from particularization” and that not all statutorily defined 
rights are sufficiently concrete to satisfy Article III.188 What makes some stat-
utory rights sufficiently concrete that other statutory rights lack? It is not 
clear. The Court held that, to be concrete, an injury “must actually exist,” and 
that it must be “real, and not abstract.”189 At the same time, the Court said 
that a concrete injury may be “intangible” and may be based on a “risk of real 
harm.”190 As one scholar has observed, “[t]he Court did not explain, however, 
why some statutory rights are not ‘real,’ especially when some intangible 
harms apparently can be.”191 
3. Information Misuse Standing After Spokeo 
Spokeo has not resolved much. The lower courts continue to divide over 
how to apply these two distinct lines of cases in the context of information 
misuse. The Court declined the invitation to resolve data breach standing 
cases in 2017,192 2018,193 and 2019.194 Below is a discussion of two catego-
ries of post-Spokeo data misuse standing cases from the lower federal courts. 
The first category is a series of cases arising from data breaches and plaintiffs’ 
claims about future harm. The second category includes several cases about 
information collection and misuse in violation of a statute. In both, courts 
have generally—though not uniformly—agreed with defendants’ arguments 
that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. In the third section, I discuss a few 
cases where lower courts have analogized statutory violations to common-
law privacy torts and identify an important development at the Supreme 
Court. 
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 The first category of cases includes Beck v. McDonald, in which a laptop 
containing the personal information of 7,400 patients was stolen from a hos-
pital.195 The stolen personal information included names, birth dates, the last 
four digits of Social Security numbers, and physical descriptors (e.g., age, 
race, gender, height, weight).196 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that the victims lacked standing under Clapper v. Amnesty Inter-
national, another recent Supreme Court standing case that has limited plain-
tiffs’ ability to establish Article III standing.197 Clapper addresses future in-
juries and requires that the “threatened injury must be certainly impending to 
constitute injury in fact and that allegations of possible future injury are not 
sufficient.”198 In Beck, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ future inju-
ries and potential for identity theft were too speculative because “the mere 
theft of [this information], without more, cannot confer Article III stand-
ing.”199 The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ costs from purchasing 
credit monitoring services could not “manufacture” standing.200 
In Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., the plaintiff’s credit card information 
was likely taken in a 2014 data breach.201 There were attempted fraudulent 
charges on her account, but the plaintiff canceled her card and never paid for 
any fraudulent charges.202 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed dismissal of her complaint, noting that “she does not allege how she 
can plausibly face a threat of future fraud, because her stolen credit card was 
promptly canceled after the breach and no other personally identifying infor-
mation—such as her birth date or Social Security number—is alleged to have 
been stolen.”203 
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A third breach case issued a split decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit found a sufficient present injury in the form of a single 
fraudulent charge on the credit card that one plaintiff had used at one of the 
defendants’ stores affected by a data breach.204 But the same panel denied 
standing to every other plaintiff, holding that a future injury premised on the 
theft of their credit card information in the same breach was insufficient for 
Article III.205 
Several circuits have found standing in the context of data breaches. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that Clapper’s future 
harm standard was satisfied in a case the Supreme Court declined to hear in 
February 2018.206 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also found 
that the potential risk of identity theft was sufficiently substantial to justify 
mitigation costs, and the mitigation costs were sufficient injury-in-fact to sat-
isfy Article III.207 The Ninth Circuit similarly concluded that an online mer-
chant’s data breach created a “substantial risk” of identity theft, thus satisfy-
ing Article III.208 Further, in litigation over the Yahoo data breaches, a district 
court found that increased risk of future identity theft was sufficient to estab-
lish standing. The court noted: “Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, 
sooner or later, to assume those consumers’ identities or to misuse Plaintiffs’ 
[personally identifiable information] in other ways.”209 
In the second category of cases, plaintiffs have brought suit because 
their personally identifiable information was collected or used in a way that 
violates a statute. Here too, the scales tip in favor of defendants. 
For example, in Meyers v. Nicolet, customers brought suit against a res-
taurant because it had failed to truncate the expiration date of the customers’ 
credit card on transaction receipts, a violation of FACTA.210 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the complaint, reasoning that 
the plaintiffs had fallen short of Spokeo’s concreteness requirement, stating: 
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“[I]t is hard to imagine how the expiration date’s presence could have in-
creased the risk that [plaintiffs’] identity would be compromised.”211 
In Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., customers alleged that retailers had 
violated two consumer protection statutes by requesting customers’ zip codes 
in connection with credit card purchases.212 The D.C. Circuit held that the 
plaintiffs’ “naked assertion that a zip code was requested and recorded with-
out any concrete consequence” did not satisfy the requirements of Spokeo.213 
The same was true in Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc.214 
There, plaintiffs sued their former cable television provider for retaining their 
addresses, telephone numbers, and Social Security numbers.215 The plaintiffs 
argued that retaining the information violated a provision of federal law that 
requires cable providers to “destroy personally identifiable information if the 
information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was col-
lected.”216 The Eighth Circuit dismissed the case, holding that the allegation 
was of a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm.”217 
The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion a few months later.218 
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs’ statutory violation claim in 2017’s In re Horizon Healthcare 
Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation.219 There, two laptops containing unen-
crypted personal information of 839,000 people were stolen from a health 
insurer.220 The plaintiffs brought a class action suit under the FCRA, alleging 
that the insurer had illegally furnished their personal information and that the 
company violated the FCRA by failing to adopt reasonable procedures to pro-
tect their information.221 The court reasoned that “with the passage of FCRA, 
Congress established that the unauthorized dissemination of personal infor-
mation by a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself—whether 
or not the disclosure of that information increased the risk of identity theft or 
some other future harm.”222 The court, reiterating a past circuit precedent, 
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noted that “unauthorized disclosures of information have long been seen as 
injurious.”223 
 After Spokeo, some lower courts have relied on analogies to common-
law privacy torts in the few cases where plaintiffs have established Article III 
standing.224 For example, the Ninth Circuit—on remand in Spokeo itself—
held that, “[e]ven if there are differences between FCRA’s cause of action 
and those recognized at common law, the relevant point is that Congress has 
chosen to protect against a harm that is at least closely similar in kind to others 
that have traditionally served as the basis for a lawsuit.”225 
The Court declined an opportunity to refine the post-Spokeo standing 
inquiry during the October 2018 Term. The Court initially granted the case, 
Frank v. Gaos, to address a cy pres settlement under the Stored Communica-
tions Act226 but requested supplemental briefing on Article III standing after 
oral argument.227 In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated and remanded 
the case and instructed the lower courts to consider the standing issue in the 
first instance.228 
4. Statutory Standing in State Court 
The takeaway is that standing in federal court is uncertain and incon-
sistent, particularly when it comes to information-related harms. But a rem-
edy for information misuse is not limited to federal law; about half the states 
have explicitly declined to follow Lujan and Proposition B.229 “To say that 
Article III’s limitations on the ‘federal judicial power’ apply only in federal 
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court is to state a tautology. . . . The point is therefore worth stressing: federal 
standing doctrine has no bearing in state court.”230 
The differential treatment of standing in state and federal court can have 
odd effects.231 Sometimes federal courts are unable to consider diversity 
cases because state law provides for a cause of action that does not satisfy 
Article III. 
For example, in Lee v. American National Insurance Co., Lee—a resi-
dent of California—sued a Texas insurance company in California state court 
under California’s unfair business practice statute.232 California law, at the 
relevant time, conferred standing on any person acting in the public interest 
to sue a business engaged in an unfair business practice;233 the plaintiff had 
not purchased insurance from the defendant or been harmed in any other 
way.234 The defendant removed the case to federal court, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing in federal court to pursue his 
unfair business claim, noting: “Lee’s standing-deficient claims will have to 
be disposed of in some manner on remand to the district court. . . . [T]here 
should be no obstacle to Lee’s refiling them in state court, where he appar-
ently has a viable cause of action which is not time-barred.”235 
A related issue recently arose in the Seventh Circuit in Collier v. SP Plus 
Corp.236 There, customers brought a putative class action in Illinois state 
court against the operator of an airport parking facility, alleging that their 
receipts included payment card expiration dates in violation of FACTA.237 
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The defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to federal question 
jurisdiction. A week later, the defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing 
that the federal court lacked Article III jurisdiction because the plaintiffs 
failed to allege a sufficiently concrete injury-in-fact under Spokeo.238 The 
plaintiffs agreed that the federal court lacked jurisdiction and sought remand 
to state court.239 The district court sided with the defendant and dismissed the 
case with prejudice, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, explaining that the re-
mand statute “required the district court to remand this case to state court, 
because it does not satisfy Article III’s requirements.”240 
∗ ∗ ∗ 
In sum, because any effort to provide a remedy for information misuse 
is certain to encounter significant constitutional standing problems under fed-
eral law, this proposed private enforcement remedy should be adopted only 
at the state level. To be sure, there are logistical hurdles to the state-law ap-
proach, such as litigating removal and remand, claim splitting, and preemp-
tion.241 But on the whole, the uncertainty wrought by Lujan and Spokeo will 
continue to corrode the deterrence and incentive-shifting effects of any pri-
vately enforceable remedy. State law provides a viable alternative. 
B. Why Breach of Fiduciary Duty? 
The private enforcement remedy should impose a fiduciary duty on en-
tities that collect and use information about users. In this Section, I articulate 
some deficiencies with other regulatory approaches, describe the particulars 
of a tort for breach of an information fiduciary’s duty, explain why this struc-
ture minimizes First Amendment objections, and argue that imposing a fidu-
ciary duty to users is a desirable and elegant counterbalance to the current 
disequilibrium.242 
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1. The Inadequacy of Public Enforcement and Contract Law 
Enforcement of information privacy through a centralized public regu-
lator has many drawbacks. For one, it may raise serious First Amendment 
questions.243 The GDPR’s “right to erasure,” for example, probably cannot 
be enforced in the United States, at least with regard to true information.244 
Second, the FTC’s experience to date is clearly inadequate to meaningfully 
deter information misuse. 
Some scholars have proposed that privacy rights should be regulated 
through contract.245 For example, Eugene Volokh has advocated for a contract 
model of privacy to ameliorate First Amendment concerns.246 He argues that, 
because agreements not to disclose are generally enforceable,247 contracts 
provide an avenue for private parties to enforce speech limitations that the 
government could not achieve through direct regulation.248 The practical ef-
fect would be that any representations a company makes about its information 
privacy practices in its terms of service would be strictly enforceable. Be-
cause of the inherent limits of regulation through terms of service, Volokh 
also advocates broadly using implied contracts for privacy that are based on 
custom, course of dealing, reasonable expectations, and other relevant fac-
tors.249 
There are good reasons to doubt the efficacy of the contract model. The 
FTC’s litigation strategy is instructive;250 for a few years, the FTC pursued 
companies for deviations from their terms of service under a deceptive trade 
practice theory of liability. But the agency quickly abandoned this approach, 
instead favoring direct regulation of privacy practices under an unfair trade 
practice theory of liability. 
Other scholars have explicitly highlighted the limitations of the contract 
model. Some have noted that the contract model doesn’t accurately reflect a 
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host of federal information privacy regulations, particularly in healthcare.251 
Further, Jack Balkin has argued that, as the government uses contracts as a 
vehicle to impose default rules and non-waivable duties, the government is 
“essentially offering a tort theory of privacy protection.”252 
2. Breach of an Information Fiduciary’s Duty 
A tort is a civil wrong.253 Many torts impose a duty on everyone, but not 
all.254 Malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty are torts that impose a duty 
on a specific person or class of persons.255 Tort law is publicly controlled and 
enforced by private parties.256 This is in contrast to contract law, which is 
privately controlled and enforced by private parties, and in contrast to crimi-
nal law, which is publicly controlled and enforced by public parties.257 
Many scholars have written that information misuse most elegantly fits 
within tort law. Some say that courts should identify a common-law tort for 
the misuse of personal information, which “would impose on data traders a 
duty to use Fair Information Practices (based on the principles of notice, 
choice, access, and security).”258 Others have argued that states should use 
tort law to fill a remedial void that federal privacy statutes have created.259 
Balkin has synthesized much of the foregoing—First Amendment con-
cerns, the limits of the contract model, and the advantages of tort.260 In doing 
so, he has proposed imposing a fiduciary duty on entities that collect, analyze, 
use, disclose, or sell personally identifiable information.261 He explains: “My 
central point is that certain kinds of information constitute matters of private 
concern not because of their content, but because of the social relationships 
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that produce them.”262 Here is how Balkin defines an information fiduciary 
and the scope of one’s duties: 
An information fiduciary is a person or business who, because of 
their relationship with another, has taken on special duties with re-
spect to the information they obtain in the course of the relation-
ship. . . . [P]rofessionals have duties to use the information they 
obtain about their clients for the client’s benefit and not to use the 
information to the client’s disadvantage.263 
Balkin’s approach is sound. Other scholars have recognized the strengths of 
this approach.264 Accordingly, one or more states should enact a statute that 
creates a tort cause of action for breach of an information fiduciary’s duties. 
3. Protection Against a Weaponized First Amendment 
An aggressive interpretation of the First Amendment presents the great-
est existential threat to the proposed information security regulatory regime. 
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. pre-
sents the most foreboding precedent for any information security regulation, 
and it has been accurately described as the “original sin” of First Amendment 
overreach.265 
Sorrell concerned a Vermont law that prohibited pharmacies from sell-
ing data about physicians’ prescribing habits to pharmaceutical companies.266 
Pharmaceutical companies use this data to tailor their physician-targeted mar-
keting campaigns, hoping to persuade physicians to prescribe a pharmaceu-
tical company’s new and expensive drugs more frequently; this process is 
called “detailing.”267 When it enacted this prohibition, Vermont cited several 
government interests, including how detailing misleads physicians, increases 
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the cost of healthcare and health insurance, and “encourages hasty and exces-
sive reliance on brand-name drugs.”268 
Writing for a six-justice majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the 
Vermont law was inconsistent with the First Amendment, and the Court 
struck it down.269 Justice Kennedy first concluded that the Vermont law was 
a content- and speaker-based restriction on protected expression and thus sub-
jected the law to heightened judicial scrutiny.270 He rejected the argument that 
the law was merely a commercial regulation, concluding that the law “im-
pose[d] more than an incidental burden on protected expression.”271 The 
Court also broadly defined protected speech to include almost any “creation 
and dissemination of information.”272 Straining credulity, Justice Kennedy 
analogized the Vermont law to “a law prohibiting trade magazines from pur-
chasing or using ink.”273 
The majority also dramatically narrowed the distinction between view-
point-discriminatory strict scrutiny and heightened scrutiny under the com-
mercial speech doctrine. The majority wrote: “To sustain the targeted, con-
tent-based burden [the Vermont law] imposes on protected expression, the 
State must show at least that the statute directly advances a substantial gov-
ernmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.”274 
Although the majority conceded that the state’s interests were substantial, the 
Court invalidated the law on tailoring grounds.275 
Sorrell is an ominous sign for any information security regulation for at 
least three distinct reasons. The first is the Court’s definition of an “incidental 
burden” on protected expression. In Sorrell, the Court rejected the argument 
that the information—collected pursuant to a government mandate—was 
akin to a commodity. The state had argued that the data was rather unlike the 
core expression at the center of the First Amendment’s protection. The Court 
flatly rejected the suggestion that different kinds of information should be 
treated differently. Adhering to this expansive definition would invalidate al-
most any conceivable government regulation that touches or concerns 
speech.276 
Second, the Court explicitly held that a business model premised on the 
collection, collation, retention, and exploitation of data was core protected 
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expression. This means that any direct regulation of businesses that traffic in 
personal information will likely be subjected to something approaching 
strict-in-theory and fatal-in-fact scrutiny. And third, the Court’s erasure of the 
distinction between heightened scrutiny of commercial speech and true strict 
scrutiny is particularly disquieting. 
The information fiduciary frame provides perhaps the strongest possible 
footing for users to reassert control over how businesses use—and misuse—
their information. Balkin argues that, when it comes to information obtained 
and disseminated within commercial and economic activities, the social con-
text of the information collection and dissemination governs whether the in-
formation receives First Amendment protection. He notes: “[T]he speech that 
occurs in fiduciary relationships is not public discourse. When law regulates 
professional relationships with clients in fields like law or medicine, it often 
regulates the way that professionals speak to clients and requires that they not 
use client information against the client’s interest.”277 For that reason, “when 
a fiduciary communicates private information about a client to the public, the 
communication does not receive standard First Amendment protection, un-
less the dependent person . . . permits the information to enter public dis-
course.”278 
Balkin illustrates this principle through a hypothetical whereby a gyne-
cologist creates an art installation called “Crazy Stuff My Patients Say,” 
which contains actual information conveyed by patients in the course of re-
ceiving medical care.279 The art installation “does not receive full First 
Amendment protection even though it takes the form of contemporary art,” 
because “[i]t uses information obtained in a fiduciary relationship without 
permission from the affected patients.”280 Just as you can sue the gynecologist 
for failing to protect your sensitive information, you can sue the person who 
misuses your data. And, critically, you can also sue the person who failed to 
appropriately secure your data. Balkin argues that “the doctor has a fiduciary 
duty to ensure that the privacy protections run with the data,”281 meaning that 
you do not need separate contracts with every person who handles the infor-
mation because “it is the fiduciary’s job to ensure that [your] privacy is pro-
tected.”282 
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Although compelling, it would be a mistake to suggest that First Amend-
ment issues are easy to resolve and will necessarily favor users over busi-
nesses. In recent years we have seen numerous legal challenges to novel reg-
ulatory regimes that the Supreme Court divisively resolved,283 and the First 
Amendment rights of business is ascendant among the Court’s conservative 
majority.284 
As Justice Kagan has argued, a majority of the Court has “turn[ed] the 
First Amendment into a sword, and [is] using it against workaday economic 
and regulatory policy.”285 Although Justice Kagan was writing in the context 
of public sector union fees, her warning applies with equal force to putative 
information security regulation. She explains: “Speech is everywhere—a part 
of every human activity (employment, health care, securities trading, you 
name it). For that reason, almost all economic and regulatory policy affects 
or touches speech. So the majority’s road runs long. And at every stop are 
black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices.”286 
4. Balancing Fiduciaries’ Interests 
The information fiduciary duty approach has many advantages. Impos-
ing a fiduciary duty to users would provide a desirable and elegant counter-
balance to the current incentives, which induce underinvestment in security 
and provoke excessive information retention. As discussed in Part II, share-
holders exert persistent downward pressure on investment in information se-
curity. Instituting a fiduciary duty between the company and the users will 
counteract the unchecked interests of shareholders. 
To put a finer point on it, underinvesting in security and retaining exces-
sive data are often perfectly rational decisions in the current environment. 
Yahoo provides an instructive example of the former. In 2010, Chinese mili-
tary hackers infiltrated several Silicon Valley technology companies, includ-
ing Google and Yahoo.287 Following these intrusions, the two companies took 
starkly different paths: Google doubled down on security, hiring hundreds of 
well-compensated security engineers, investing hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in security, and adopting a new internal motto—“Never Again.”288 Ya-
hoo, on the other hand, was in the midst of staging a corporate turnaround, 
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and the company did not meaningfully invest in cybersecurity—officers even 
stigmatized security-minded employees by dubbing them the “Paranoids.”289 
These decisions are worthy of criticism, but they were nonetheless ra-
tional choices at the time they were made: “Specifically, Yahoo may convinc-
ingly argue [in a shareholder derivative suit] that the corporate turnaround it 
was attempting to stage in the midst of the breach was inherently a risky 
proposition.”290 Although we may tolerate the ramifications of that risky 
proposition for shareholders, we shouldn’t demand that uninformed users do 
the same. If anything, shareholders have assumed the risk of information mis-
use costs to a far greater degree than users of a company’s electronic services. 
Sometimes playing fast and loose with information security is profita-
ble—or, worse, is perceived to be potentially profitable.291 Imposing a fidu-
ciary duty between users and companies will help defeat this perverse incen-
tive. Instead of allowing companies to commoditize users’ information for 
shareholder benefit, corporate officers will need to balance competing fidu-
ciary interests—how to maximize profit without betraying users. 
∗ ∗ ∗ 
In sum, regulating information security faces many legal hurdles. Im-
posing a fiduciary duty on companies that collect and retain users’ personally 
identifiable information overcomes several of these hurdles and also provides 
a counterbalance to unchecked shareholder excesses. 
C. Why Strict Liability? 
An information fiduciary duty is a good start. But it, alone, is unlikely 
to sufficiently shift corporate incentives to invest heavily in information se-
curity. To give this tort some teeth, the law should impose strict liability for 
breach of an information fiduciary’s duty. In this Section, I identify the short-
comings of a negligence regime, make an affirmative case for strict liability, 
and examine the arguments against strict liability.292 
There are significant hurdles to successfully applying negligence law to 
information misuse. “[P]laintiffs so far have had little success in obtaining 
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tort recovery for . . . instances of identity theft.”293 Because negligence “re-
quires a court to resolve apparently insurmountable issues pertaining to the 
elements of duty, breach, and compensable harm . . . the black-letter rules 
would seem to either bar the tort claim or make it extremely difficult for vic-
tims of identity theft to recover for their losses.”294 
The rationales for strict liability in products cases apply with even more 
force to informational harms: “[V]ictims of identity theft would have to prove 
what reasonable care requires within a technologically complex and con-
stantly evolving environment, an evidentiary burden comparable to, if not 
greater than, the burden faced by a consumer trying to prove that a product 
manufacturer failed to adopt reasonable quality-control measures.”295 
Several scholars have argued that data breaches and other common types 
of information misuse should be evaluated under a strict liability regime.296 
There are two primary reasons the law ever turns to strict liability. First, 
a negligence standard fails when there is difficulty attributing liability and 
difficulty recovering damages, which result “from the multiplicity of actors 
and the complexity of their interconnected relationships.”297 
Second, a strict liability standard ensures that liability for harms is as-
signed to the party or parties best able to bear it.298 Under a negligence stand-
ard, the law assumes the parties are relatively symmetrical—that “[both] par-
ties bear, and are able to bear, comparable responsibility for preventing or 
accepting the risk of harm.”299 We employ strict liability in the context of 
ultrahazardous activities and products liability because they present “risks 
that would be unreasonably, or impossibly, costly for individuals to de-
tect.”300 
Both reasons weigh in favor of applying strict liability to information 
misuse. Cybersecurity is sufficiently complex that attributing liability under 
a negligence regime is effectively impossible.301 And it is similarly absurd to 
suggest that users are capable of bearing cybersecurity risks. Companies hold 
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themselves out as being trustworthy caretakers of your information,302 and 
there is almost nothing a user can do to corroborate those representations or 
interrogate the sufficiency of a company’s information security practices.303 
To be sure, strict liability has its own challenges. For one, strict liability, 
alone, does nothing to resolve the question of damages.304 This is one of the 
reasons that a state should enact a statutorily prescribed schedule of damages. 
A second issue concerns who should be subject to strict liability. Be-
cause cybersecurity is a complicated web of interconnected actors—any one 
of which could be primarily at fault for information misuse305—the question 
is: which actors should be covered by the statute and thus subject to strict 
liability? 
At the very least, consumer-facing businesses that collect information 
from consumers should be covered because they “present a near-classic case 
in which strict liability is appropriate,” and any information security strict 
liability regime “should be designed to apply only to those firms where prin-
ciples of ordinary negligence or contract law do not sufficiently protect par-
ties from security related risks.”306 Data traffickers (or data “brokers”) also 
provide a perfect example of the attributes of the kind of parties that should 
be subject to strict liability.307 Several states already have statutes that address 
what constitutes a “covered entity” for purposes of their breach notification 
and information security statutes, and in many cases these definitions suffice 
for a starting point for assigning strict liability. 
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In short, if a business model is premised on the company collecting, re-
taining, processing, selling, or sharing users’ information, the statute should 
presume the company is covered and thus subject to strict liability. 
D. Why Nominal Damages? 
The private enforcement remedy should impose only nominal damages 
(and reasonable attorney’s fees) for strict liability. But as a defendant be-
comes more culpable for information misuse, the penalty should ratchet up. 
Below, I explain why using the so-called private attorney general doctrine is 
a sound approach to enforcing remedies for information misuse.308 
The private attorney general doctrine allows private citizens to enforce 
public rights, in contrast to enforcement by a public regulator.309 The private 
attorney general doctrine is thus a partial exception to the American rule that 
each party usually covers its own legal expenses.310 Granting attorney’s fees 
to successful litigants incentivizes these suits: In the classic case, a party 
brings suit to enforce a right that would otherwise not be enforced.311 Hence, 
by granting attorney’s fees, “a court applying the doctrine is in effect reor-
dering public policy priorities established by the political process through the 
creation of judicial incentives for the enforcement of such unenforced 
rights.”312 
Congress has used the private attorney general doctrine in several con-
texts, such as in the Civil Rights Act of 1964313 and in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.314 Over time, however, federal courts have undermined the 
efficacy of this regulatory regime by concluding that plaintiffs who receive 
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nominal damages are not entitled to attorney’s fees.315 This hostility in the 
federal courts towards the private attorney general doctrine is another reason 
to adopt this proposal at the state level. 
Pairing the private attorney general doctrine with robust breach notifi-
cation is a powerful way to shift incentives. Any person who receives notice 
of information misuse should be empowered to bring suit against the offend-
ing organization. Binding these two rights together—the right to receive no-
tice and the right to bring a private suit—helps overcome one of the biggest 
obstacles to information misuse litigation: attributing liability. (Strict liability 
helps overcome the other big obstacle: proving and recovering damages.) 
The proposed penalty schedule should apply to both the information 
misuse itself and compliance with breach notification requirements. Strict ad-
herence to breach notification has largely failed to date because there is no 
meaningful mechanism to require companies’ compliance.316 Under the 
GDPR, for example, companies that fail to notify affected persons about a 
data breach are subject to fines of ten million euros or two percent of annual 
revenue, whichever is higher.317 
There are three primary reasons for using the penalty schedule proposed 
above in Part III.B. First, it provides the opportunity for discovery. By requir-
ing companies to notify users about the breach, providing a private cause of 
action, and imposing strict liability, users will be empowered to bring suit 
against companies that have misused their data. Upon bringing suit, these 
private attorneys general will have the authority to conduct discovery to de-
termine whether an organization was negligent, reckless, or worse. In other 
words, structuring the remedy in this way requires companies that misuse 
users’ information to finance an outside investigation into their information 
security failures. 
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Second, the law should shift incentives without being unduly punitive. 
If a company has not been negligent or worse, the company may only be 
liable for nominal damages and attorney’s fees. This thus prompts a company 
to finance an investigation; if no additional wrongdoing is found, the com-
pany may not be liable for anything other than the costs of the investigation 
(assuming the cost of the investigation is sufficient to meaningfully deter fu-
ture information misuse).318 
Third, the scheme prevents a windfall for the attorneys that bring suit. 
Because of contingent fee arrangements, there may be an inequitable windfall 
for the named plaintiffs’ lawyers to grant them both fees and a third of com-
pensatory damages if the company has not been negligent. Accordingly, if a 
company has not been negligent (or worse), the private attorney general 
should be paid a reasonable fee, and uncovering greater wrongdoing thus has 
its own financial incentive. And requiring that companies remit penalties to 
the state treasury also enables deterrence without an undue windfall. 
V. ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES 
The proposed private enforcement remedy has both advantages and 
drawbacks. Part III described the proposed right and remedy.319 Part IV pro-
vided the rationales for the remedy’s four core features.320 Section A of this 
Part articulates normative reasons for adopting the proposal.321 Section B 
then highlights some particular challenges to the proposed approach.322 
A. Advantages of a Private Enforcement Remedy 
There are five primary benefits of the private enforcement remedy—
furthering three primary goals and two practical advantages. 
1. Primary Goals 
The private enforcement remedy will further three primary goals: incen-
tivizing more investment in information security, disincentivizing excessive 
data retention, and bolstering the market for cybersecurity insurance. 
 The first primary benefit is that the remedy ensures that companies that 
misuse users’ information will be held liable. Companies will thus have 
greater incentive to invest in information security and to prevent information 
misuse. 
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More specifically, adopting this proposal will help address the three rea-
sons for persistent too-little security disequilibrium articulated in Part II.B. 
First, information misuse persists because it is currently an externality—users 
pay the costs of the company’s information security failures. By making lia-
bility a certainty, the law would begin internalizing these costs. Adopting the 
remedy would shift these costs more directly onto the misusing company. 
Second, information misuse persists because of variability of marginal 
costs. I address that below in the context of cybersecurity insurance. Third, 
information misuse persists because of information imperfection—the idea 
that a company, ex ante, has little way to know how much it should invest in 
cybersecurity because it cannot concretely forecast the costs of an infor-
mation misuse incident. The remedy combats this problem by promoting 
more perfect information. The proposal will help clarify that, if a company 
misuses its users’ information, the company will at least owe nominal dam-
ages and attorney’s fees. This clarity will allow the company to make more 
informed decisions about investing in information security. 
The second primary benefit is that the remedy will impose some actual 
costs on excessive information retention. Disincentivizing information reten-
tion is an unbridled benefit of this approach. 
The law must answer two questions about information security regula-
tion: “When is it legal to gather that information? And once it is gathered, 
how long may it be retained?”323 The answer to those questions right now—
with a few exceptions—is that “anything may be gathered by anyone and 
kept forever.”324 But, as briefly alluded to earlier, direct regulation of infor-
mation expungement is likely to face constitutional challenges.325 By raising 
the costs of information retention, the proposed enforcement remedy will cre-
ate—for the first time—an incentive for companies to destroy, rather than 
retain, every byte of user data. This remedial scheme will thus promote im-
provements in both information security and digital privacy, accomplishing 
the latter by raising the transaction costs of retaining excessive user infor-
mation.326 
The ongoing debacles at Facebook have laid bare the absurdity of the 
digital advertising ecosystem. Although the Cambridge Analytica incident 
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may not technically have been a “data breach,” “[i]t is something even more 
troubling: an all-too-natural consequence of Facebook’s business model, 
which involves having people go to the site for social interaction, only to be 
quietly subjected to an enormous level of surveillance.”327 In addition to log-
ging your every metric on nearly every Facebook product, the company col-
lects your browsing history, purchases external information about you, and 
maintains shadow profiles of non-users—“an involuntary dossier from which 
you cannot opt out.”328 
The takeaway is this: “[T]here are now private entities that collectively 
aim to know every detail of our lives, from cradle to grave. They have the 
technology to gather it, they have the space to store it, and they have built 
businesses on getting it.”329 Information security policy reform should not 
just focus on shifting costs onto the parties who should bear them, though 
that would be a good start. We should also focus on why we allow this for-
profit panopticon to propagate and how we can blunt its incentive structure 
and retard its growth. 
The third primary benefit of this regulatory regime is that it will increase 
efficiencies and equities through shifting information misuse costs. 
Many have written on the woeful state of the cybersecurity insurance 
industry.330 By adopting strict liability for information misuse, the law would 
shift the insurance burden from users to businesses. This is normatively de-
sirable for at least three reasons. 
First, as is the case in other strict liability contexts, businesses are more 
capable of bearing the costs of the harm than users.331 
Second, shifting the insurance burden to businesses is not the end of the 
story. Ultimately, those costs are passed back onto users in a more equitable 
and distributed way. How so? Businesses will now have an incentive to take 
out an insurance policy; the premiums of this insurance policy, then, raise the 
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cost of the business’s products.332 “In effect, adopting a strict-liability regime 
is equivalent to adopting a mandate that parties have insurance against harms 
that may befall others with whom they interact. That is, strict liability is ef-
fectively a mandate for third-party cyber insurance.”333 
Third, as alluded to briefly above, this burden shifting helps resolve the 
variability of marginal costs because insurance premiums are consistent. 
Businesses can thus predict and plan, ex ante, how much to invest in infor-
mation security with more confidence and certainty. 
By imposing strict liability on information misuse, businesses are forced 
to insure against data breaches and other information misuse. This, alone, is 
good policy, because businesses are currently externalizing information mis-
use harms. Reality suggests the opposite should be true, because businesses 
are more capable of bearing these costs than users are. But there are benefits 
over and beyond simply shifting the costs to the appropriate party. Requiring 
businesses to insure against information misuse will induce them to seek 
someone else to underwrite this risk—namely, an insurance company. So 
businesses that traffic in information will all have new incentive to enter the 
market for insurance, which others have argued will improve the market.334 
And the net result is that the costs of information misuse will be more pre-
dictable, less variable, and more distributed across multiple actors. 
2. Practical Advantages 
There are two practical advantages to the proposed remedial scheme: 
eschewing a centralized regulator and avoiding Congress. 
First, critics of the FTC and the GDPR often argue that uneven and un-
certain enforcement is a problem.335 And pro-industry critics are hardly alone 
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in their wariness of the public enforcement model. California’s abrupt shift 
from the private-enforcement ballot measure to the public-enforcement leg-
islation provoked sharp criticism from California’s Attorney General, the of-
fice empowered to enforce the new statute.336 
The proposed scheme would end this regulatory uncertainty and elimi-
nate the challenges that public enforcement creates. Under this proposal, a 
covered entity that discovers misuse would be required to notify users about 
it, and a user’s receipt of that notification would itself be sufficient to estab-
lish strict liability. 
Congress has used this so-called private attorney general doctrine in 
other contexts where public enforcement is impractical. Consider, for exam-
ple, the Americans with Disabilities Act. Congress provided a private right of 
action because it understood that the Department of Justice, alone, could not 
ensure widespread ADA compliance. So too here. 
Second, the benefits of avoiding Congress (and federal law generally) 
are palpable. Congress’s half-hearted attempts to update regulation of infor-
mation security in the twenty-first century have failed, and the institution has 
largely rendered itself irrelevant.337 If anything, Congress should be consid-
ered a threat to meaningful reform.338 Given the powerful influence of the 
technology sector’s lobby in Washington, any federal legislation is likely to 
be quite friendly to Silicon Valley and preempt more rigorous state-law reg-
ulation.339 And that’s before constitutional challenges undermine any enacted 
regulatory regime. 
The April 2018 congressional testimony of Facebook’s chief executive, 
Mark Zuckerberg, starkly illustrates the shortcomings of the institution. As 
one news report gently put it, the hearings “revealed a vast knowledge gap 
between Silicon Valley and the nation’s capital, where lawmakers struggled 
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to grasp how the technology works and which problems—misinformation, 
sharing of data to third parties or political biases coded into algorithms—
needed to be addressed.”340 A less charitable read is that Congress lacks the 
technical expertise, the political will, and the institutional tools to lead in this 
area. 
Accordingly, states should continue to lead—and they should lobby ag-
gressively to prevent Congress’s attempts to preempt state regulation. 
B. Challenges for a Private Enforcement Remedy 
There are three chief challenges to adopting the private enforcement 
remedy as proposed: the burden of litigating removal and remand, concerns 
over federal preemption, and lingering First Amendment concerns.341 
The first challenge involves state law, which poses a pair of logistical 
hurdles, including claim splitting and the burden of litigating removal and 
remand. A company sued in state court for breach of fiduciary duty is likely 
to remove the case to federal court.342 The federal court, however, will lack 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim if it does not satisfy the Lujan and 
Spokeo standing requirements. Even though Article III standing is jurisdic-
tional—so the federal court could remand sua sponte—plaintiffs will likely 
need to affirmatively argue for remand to state court.343 It may be a burden to 
always litigate this issue before proceeding to discovery and the merits. The 
one potential upside is that, because defendants are liable for attorney’s fees, 
defendants may realize, over time, that litigating removal and remand makes 
the cases more expensive and thus increases their own legal bills for essen-
tially no benefit. 
The other logistical problem is claim splitting: if a plaintiff brings any 
other claims alongside the breach of information fiduciary claim, the claims 
will likely be bifurcated and litigated separately in federal and state court. In 
some circumstances, only the information fiduciary claim will be remanded 
to state court, and thus only that claim will be subject to fee shifting. 
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The second challenge involves preemption: an unavoidable conse-
quence of creating a state law remedy is that Congress could preempt it.344 
In August 2018, the New York Times reported that, in direct response to 
the California Consumer Privacy Act, Facebook and other technology com-
panies had begun an aggressive lobbying campaign for federal legislation that 
would “put into place a kinder set of rules that would give the companies 
wide leeway over how personal digital information was handled.”345 
But this gamble has its own risks. Congress has repeatedly failed to en-
act meaningful cybersecurity legislation,346 and even if Congress were to act, 
there is little to assure that covered entities will end up better off under a 
federal regulatory regime. In any event, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has said 
that any federal legislation that preempts state law—like the California Con-
sumer Privacy Act—is a nonstarter in the current Congress.347 
As for the third challenge, imposing a fiduciary duty on entities that col-
lect and retain user information insulates the remedy from some First Amend-
ment attacks. But it would be naïve to suggest that this regulatory structure is 
completely immune from constitutional objection.348 It is inevitable that, 
should an information fiduciary duty be enacted by statute, businesses that 
traffic in information will challenge the statute under the First Amendment. 
How, exactly, this novel regulatory regime would be resolved by the Supreme 
Court is uncertain and thus presents a significant potential challenge. In the 
end, however, the fiduciary duty provides the strongest possible argument 
against the First Amendment challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Information security presents one of the most complex and difficult 
challenges of the twenty-first century. In the current state of affairs, busi-
nesses have every incentive to traffic in excessive information and have little 
incentive to take reasonable steps to invest in securing all that information. 
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Users, meanwhile, have no way to opt out of this profit-driven panopticon 
and have no meaningful way to vindicate their rights against companies that 
misuse their information. 
This state of affairs is the byproduct of deliberate choices. We, as a so-
ciety, have consciously decided against imposing any kind of real regulation 
on Silicon Valley companies, and the worst excesses of that industry have 
metastasized across our modern economy. Surveillance capitalism is a boom-
ing business, and we have only recently begun considering a different path. 
As dispiriting as this may seem, it does not need to be this way. We can 
choose to stop enabling companies’ externalization of informational harms, 
and we can choose to assign informational costs to the parties best able to 
bear them. Some states have already started realizing this power to choose. I 
believe more should follow, and the proposed remedial scheme provides a 
blueprint for future efforts. 
